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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
 Appellant Center for Investigative Reporting (“CIR”) 
seeks a permanent injunction that would require the 
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority 
(“SEPTA”) to run an advertisement on the inside of SEPTA 
buses.  The advertisement promotes CIR’s research on racial 
disparities in the home mortgage lending market.  SEPTA 
rejected the advertisement under two provisions of its 2015 
Advertising Standards, which prohibit advertisements that are 
political in nature or discuss matters of public debate (the 
“Challenged Provisions”).  The question presented is whether 
the Challenged Provisions violate the First Amendment.  
Because the Challenged Provisions are incapable of reasoned 
application, we answer that question yes.  Accordingly, we will 
reverse and instruct the District Court to grant declaratory 
relief and issue a permanent injunction preventing SEPTA 
from enforcing the Challenged Provisions to exclude CIR’s 
advertisement. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 The Parties 
 SEPTA has operated Philadelphia’s mass transit 
system, including buses, subways, commuter rail, light rail, 
and trolley service, since 1964.1  Like many other public 
 
 1 This Court has found, and the parties do not dispute, 
that SEPTA is a government actor “constrained by the First . . 
. Amendment[.]”  Christ’s Bride Ministries, Inc. v. SEPTA, 148 
F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir. 1998). 
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transportation authorities, SEPTA generates revenue by 
accepting advertisements that it displays in its facilities and on 
its vehicles.  The advertising agency Intersection (formerly 
Titan Outdoor, LLC) manages SEPTA’s advertising program, 
including selling advertising space and reviewing proposed 
advertisements.  SEPTA’s contract with Intersection includes 
the Advertising Standards, which apply to all the advertising 
space in or on SEPTA vehicles and facilities.  When 
Intersection determines that a proposed advertisement may 
violate the Advertising Standards, it sends the advertisement to 
Gino Benedetti, SEPTA’s General Counsel, who makes the 
final decision whether to accept the advertisement. 
 CIR is a California-based, nonprofit, investigative news 
organization.  Its mission is to advance social justice through 
the dissemination of verifiable, nonpartisan facts about public 
issues.  CIR publishes its reporting on various platforms, such 
as its news website Reveal (www.revealnews.org), national 
radio show, and podcast. 
 SEPTA’s Rejection of the Proposed Advertisement 
 In January 2018, CIR submitted a proposed 
advertisement for display on the interior of SEPTA buses.  The 
proposed advertisement consisted of a comic strip entitled “A 
Stacked Deck,” which summarized the findings of a then-
forthcoming CIR report detailing the results of its year-long 
investigation into mortgage lending trends throughout the 
United States.  The report, which CIR published on February 
18, 2019, indicated that in 61 metropolitan areas, applicants of 
color were more likely to be denied conventional home 
purchase mortgages.  
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 On February 22, 2018, SEPTA rejected CIR’s proposed 
advertisement because “[d]isparate lending is a matter of 
public debate and litigation.”  App. 576.  SEPTA included in 
its rejection email a copy of the 2015 Advertising Standards, 
which were operative at the time.  Id.  SEPTA later clarified 
that it rejected the proposed advertisement “under Standards 
9(b)(iv)(a) and (b)” of the 2015 Advertising Standards.  App. 
613.  These provisions, both of which CIR challenges, read: 
Prohibited Advertising Content.  Advertising is 
prohibited on transit facilities, products and 
vehicles if it or its content falls into one or more 
of the following categories – 
(a) Advertisements promoting or opposing a 
political party, or promoting or opposing the 
election of any candidate or group of candidates 
for federal, state, judicial or local government 
offices are prohibited.  In addition, 
advertisements that are political in nature or 
contain political messages, including 
advertisements involving political or judicial 
figures and/or advertisements involving an issue 
that is political in nature in that it directly or 
indirectly implicates the action, inaction, 
prospective action or policies of a government 
entity. 
 
(b) Advertisements expressing or advocating 
an opinion, position or viewpoint on matters of 
public debate about economic, political, 





 On August 6, 2018, months after commencing the 
instant action, CIR submitted a second proposed advertisement 
to SEPTA.  As the District Court explained, the revised 
advertisement removed two panels from the original—one 
showing “a white hand handing keys and stick of dynamite to 
a black hand,” and another showing “African-Americans 
holding signs protesting . . . and a white guy not part of the 
protest.”  Ctr. for Investigative Reporting v. SEPTA, 337 F. 
Supp. 3d 562, 574 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (alteration in original).  In 
the letter accompanying this proposed advertisement, CIR 
explained that it removed the two panels because they were 
ones that SEPTA identified as particularly concerning. 
 By letter dated September 21, 2018, SEPTA rejected 
this second advertisement, explaining that it violated the same 
provisions as the first.  SEPTA explained that the comic “as a 
whole,” as opposed to isolated elements, violated the 
Advertising Standards.  Dist. Ct. Dkt. 2:18-cv-01839, ECF No. 
32-1 at 2.  Despite its contention that the entire comic was 
problematic, SEPTA highlighted various unchanged, 
individual elements of the comic that continued to concern 
SEPTA.  These include:  On panel 1, the phrase “A STACKED 
DECK”; on panel 2, the words “regularly,” “DENIED,” and 
“dream”; on panel 6, the sentence “This is just the latest in the 
United States’ SORDID HISTORY of unequal access to 
owning a home” and the accompanying image; and on panel 
10, the phrase “a deck stacked against them” and the 
accompanying image.  Id. 
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 CIR’s Allegations 
 On May 2, 2018, CIR filed the Complaint, alleging that 
SEPTA violated its First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by 
rejecting its proposed advertisement.  To vindicate these rights, 
CIR seeks a declaratory judgment that the Challenged 
Provisions are unconstitutional and a permanent injunction 
prohibiting SEPTA from enforcing the Challenged Provisions 
to exclude CIR’s proposed advertisement. 
 District Court Proceedings  
 On August 17, 2018, CIR filed a motion for a 
preliminary injunction.  The Court authorized the parties to 
engage in limited discovery, including depositions, prior to the 
hearing on that motion.  On September 14, 2018, the District 
Court held the preliminary injunction hearing. 
 On September 25, 2018, the District Court denied CIR’s 
motion without prejudice.  In reaching this holding, the District 
Court applied the familiar test for preliminary relief:  “A party 
seeking a preliminary injunction must show: (1) a likelihood of 
success on the merits; (2) that it will suffer irreparable harm if 
the injunction is denied; (3) that granting preliminary relief will 
not result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) 
that the public interest favors such relief.”  Kos Pharm., Inc. v. 
Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 2004).   
 The District Court found that while CIR had shown that 
it suffered an irreparable injury, none of the other factors 
favored granting preliminary injunctive relief.  The District 
Court explained that (1) because of the scant evidence about 
SEPTA’s reasons for implementing the 2015 Advertising 
Standards the District Court could not determine whether CIR 
 
15 
was likely to succeed on the merits, and (2) neither the balance 
of the equities nor the public interest clearly supported either 
party.  Because the bench trial was scheduled to begin in less 
than one week, the District Court determined that it would 
prioritize bringing the case to a final disposition.  The District 
Court therefore declined to enter a preliminary injunction. 
 On October 1, 2018, the District Court held a bench 
trial.  At trial, the District Court heard live testimony from Gino 
Benedetti, SEPTA’s General Counsel, and the parties 
presented exhibits and stipulated facts.   
 At trial, as to Subsection (a) (i.e., the political 
provision), Benedetti testified on direct examination that the 
terms “political” and “political in nature” were “essentially the 
same to [him].”  Ctr. for Investigative Reporting, 337 F. Supp. 
3d at 577.  He stated that the phrase “directly or indirectly 
implicates the action, inaction, prospective action or policies 
of a government entity . . . defines or connects with what’s 
political in nature.”  Id.  On cross-examination, however, he 
testified that the terms “political” and “political in nature” have 
distinct and separate meanings and that “implicate” could 
mean “advocate[]” or “call[] for.”  Id.  
 As to Subsection (b) (i.e., the public debate provision), 
Benedetti testified that to determine whether something is a 
“matter of public debate” he performs “a mechanical type of 
analysis that  . . . look[s] to see what is being argued, debated 
in society in general.”  Id.  He explained that he looks at “the 
entire ad” and evaluates “holistically . . . the subject matter of 
that ad being debated in society at large.”  Id.  That process, 
according to Benedetti, requires that he use “common sense” 
and have discussions to determine what is a matter of public 
debate.  Id.  In addition, he testified that sometimes 
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advertisements that violate the public debate provision “could 
be controversial ads” and that an advertisement can involve 
politics and not violate either provision.  Id. at 578.  
 At trial, as the District Court noted, Benedetti provided 
inconsistent testimony regarding his process for determining 
whether proposed advertisements violate the Advertising 
Standards.  Id. at 578–80.  He stated that he did not view certain 
advertisements for commercial services as political or touching 
on matters of public debate.  Id. at 579.  For example, he 
approved an advertisement by Fusion that depicted people of 
color, one of whom was wearing a shirt that read “My Life 
Matters,” and displayed the phrase “As American Ads.”  Id.  
Benedetti testified that he did not view this advertisement as 
“implicat[ing] any matters of public debate on social issues.”  
Id. (alteration in original). 
 Yet he also admitted that sometimes a commercial 
advertisement could pose a problem under the Challenged 
Provisions.  For example, he testified that a hypothetical 
advertisement that said consumers can purchase Pepsi cheaper 
in Norristown (which does not have a soda tax) than in 
Philadelphia (which does have a soda tax) “could still be a 
problem under sub-standard (a) or (b) . . . because the notion 
of the soda tax and everything that surrounds it is being debated 
in the public.”  Id.  Benedetti testified that he gives commercial 
and non-commercial advertisements the same treatment.  That 
testimony is supported by the fact that the 2015 Advertising 
Standards do not draw such a distinction.  The District Court 
nonetheless found that Benedetti “apparently considers the 
commercial nature of certain advertisements.”  Id. at 579–80. 
 Benedetti also failed to provide clear testimony about 
the definition of the phrase “political in nature,” which appears 
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in the political provision.  He testified that mentioning a law or 
regulation could be considered political in nature, but he also 
testified that an advertisement could be political in nature 
without “directly or indirectly implicating the action, inaction, 
prospective action or policies of a government entity.”  Id. at 
580. 
 During trial, the District Court also considered several 
additional advertisements that CIR submitted as exhibits to 
illustrate SEPTA’s allegedly discriminatory application of its 
advertising restrictions.  These advertisements included 
examples of both accepted and rejected applications.  The 
District Court described each of these exhibits in its decision.  
See id. at 581–83. 
 Rejected advertisements include the following: (1) an 
advertisement stating “Dear Art Museum: Art is Expensive!  
So is constructing new buildings!  We totally get why you can’t 
pay all your employees a living wage!”; and (2) an 
advertisement from Bethany Christian Services saying, 
“Unplanned Pregnancy?  Now what?  Consider adoption as an 
option.  You don’t have to make your decision alone.”  Id. at 
581.  Benedetti testified that these advertisements were 
rejected because they involved the issue of a living wage and 
abortion, respectively, both of which he considered to be 
matters of public debate.  Id.  at 581 nn.3–4.  Other rejected 
advertisements included one from the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, which announced, “Sex trafficking, 
Forced labor, Domestic Servitude.  It’s happening in our 
community.  Get informed.”  Id. at 581.  Benedetti could not 
explain why this advertisement was rejected, and SEPTA did 
not offer other evidence to shed light on this action. 
 
18 
 Accepted advertisements include the following: (1) an 
advertisement from the Philadelphia Host Committee that 
stated “Welcome [Democratic National Committee].  We are 
Philadelphia’s: Union Middle Class Jobs, office cleaners, 
community, neighbors, building service workers, window 
washers, security officers, families, school district workers.  
Road out of poverty”; (2) an advertisement for an event at the 
African American Museum that featured pictures of Martin 
Luther King, Jr., Cesar Chavez, and Lucretia Mott and posed, 
among other things, the question: “What will you do for 
Peace?”; and (3) a Facebook advertisement stating:  “Fake 
news is not your friend,” “Data misuse is not your friend,” 
“Clickbait is not your friend,” “Fake accounts are not your 
friends.”  Id. at 582–83.   
 Benedetti testified that the Philadelphia Host 
Committee advertisement may not actually comply with the 
2015 Advertising Standards.  Id. at 582 n.13.  He further 
testified that the Peace advertisement did not violate the policy 
because it did not “tak[e] a position or ask[] for action.”  Id. at 
583 n.14. 
 Other pertinent, accepted advertisements include those 
from banks regarding home loans.  Several of these 
advertisements bear Equal Housing Lender and/or Member 
FDIC logos.  Id. at 584.  Relatedly, CIR identified an 
advertisement from the Housing Equality Center which stated, 
“Housing discrimination is illegal.  Housing Equality Center 
can help you understand your rights.”  Id.  Benedetti, however, 
could not recall whether SEPTA accepted that advertisement. 
 After trial, the parties submitted proposed findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, and the Court heard oral argument. 
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 District Court Decision 
 On November 28, 2018, the District Court issued 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law holding that portions 
of the Challenged Provisions were incapable of reasoned 
application.  The District Court, however, struck problematic 
portions from the 2015 Advertising Standards and ordered 
SEPTA to revise the policy consistent with the District Court’s 
decision.2  The District Court then found that with the overly 
 
2 As revised by the District Court, the Challenged Provisions 
read: 
(a) Advertisements promoting or opposing a 
political party, or promoting or opposing the 
election of any candidate or group of candidates 
for federal, state, judicial or local government 
offices are prohibited.  In addition, 
advertisements that are political in nature or 
contain political messages, including 
advertisements involving political or judicial 
figures and/or advertisements involving an issue 
that is political in nature in that it directly or 
indirectly implicates the action, inaction, 
prospective action or policies of a government 
entity. 
 
(b) Advertisements expressing or advocating 
an opinion, position or viewpoint on matters of 
public debate about economic, political, 
religious, historical or social issues. 
Id. 604–05.   
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broad language removed, CIR’s viewpoint discrimination 
challenges, both facial and as-applied, fail.  The District 
Court’s decision can be grouped into four principal parts. 
 First, the District Court determined that the relevant 
forum was the inside of SEPTA buses and that SEPTA had 
sufficiently “closed the forum to public speech and debate.”  
Id. at 602.   
 Second, having found that the relevant forum was 
nonpublic, the District Court then evaluated whether the 
Challenged Provisions of the 2015 Advertising Standards were 
capable of reasoned application.  Applying the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky, 138 
S. Ct. 1876 (2018), the District Court found portions of both 
the political and public debate provisions to be “too broad to 
pass constitutional muster under Mansky.”  Ctr. for 
Investigative Reporting, 337 F. Supp. 3d at 604.  Instead of 
invalidating the Challenged Provisions in their entirety, 
however, the District Court excised portions of them.  In 
addition to amending the Challenged Provisions, the Court 
directed SEPTA to adopt a meet-and-confer program under 
which it would discuss with advertisers proposed 
advertisements that SEPTA deems violative of its standards.  
Id. at 605.   
 Third, the District Court applied the two-step test 
articulated by this Circuit in NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, 
834 F.3d 435 (3d Cir. 2016) and held that SEPTA’s 
Advertising Standards, “with the stricken language removed, . 
. . are now facially valid, reasonable, and constitutional.”  Ctr. 
for Investigative Reporting, 337 F. Supp. 3d at 612.  
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 Fourth, the District Court found that the Challenged 
Provisions, as amended by the District Court, were viewpoint 
neutral on their face and as applied to CIR.  Id. at 615–18.   
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331.  This Court has appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. 
 “We review a district court’s legal conclusions de novo, 
and ordinarily review its factual findings for clear error.”  
Pittsburgh League of Young Voters Educ. Fund v. Port 
Authority of Allegheny Cnty., 653 F.3d 290, 295 (3d Cir. 2011).  
Because this case implicates the First Amendment, however, 
we “make an independent examination of the whole record.”  
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984).  
Nonetheless, we defer to the District Court to the extent its 
factual findings “concern witness credibility.”  Fulton v. City 
of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140, 152 (3d Cir. 2019); Bose, 466 
U.S. at 499, 510–11.  
III. DISCUSSION 
 CIR makes two arguments why the Challenged 
Provisions of the Advertising Standards, as revised by the 
District Court, are unconstitutional: (1) they discriminate based 
on viewpoint as applied to CIR and (2) they impose an 
impermissible restriction on speech given the public nature of 
the forum.3  Although these arguments implicate several First 
 
 3 At oral argument, counsel for CIR conceded that on 
appeal CIR was not making a facial viewpoint challenge to the 
Challenged Provisions, as it had below.  Counsel for CIR also 
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Amendment doctrines, we need only address whether the 
Challenged Provisions are capable of reasoned application.  
Because we hold that they are not, we will reverse and remand 
the case back to the District Court for further proceedings 
consistent with this decision. 
 Applicable Law 
 The First Amendment prohibits two forms of content-
based discrimination, subject matter discrimination and 
viewpoint discrimination, which is especially egregious.  See 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 
828–29 (1995) (“Discrimination against speech because of its 
message is presumed to be unconstitutional.”).  Subject matter 
restrictions may be permissible depending on the nature of the 
forum to which the speaker seeks access.  Id.  In those cases, 
“[t]he State may not exclude speech where its [restriction] is 
not ‘reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum.’”  
Id. (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 
Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 804–06 (1985)).  In contrast, viewpoint 
restrictions are impermissible in any forum.  Id. 
 CIR brings both a facial and as-applied challenge to 
SEPTA’s current Advertising Standards.  CIR’s facial 
challenge is that the current Advertising Standards constitute 
an impermissible subject matter restriction.  Its as-applied 
challenge is that the current Advertising Standards 
discriminate against CIR’s viewpoint.  Because we hold, for 
 
noted that it is challenging how the District Court revised the 




the reasons set out below, that the current Advertising 
Standards are an impermissible subject matter restriction on 
speech, we need not “pause to consider whether [the provision] 
might admit some permissible applications.”  Iancu v. Brunetti, 
139 S. Ct. 2294, 2302 (2019). 
  In our recent decision Northeastern Pennsylvania 
Freethought Society v. County of Lackawanna Transit System, 
we explained that district courts must address whether a 
particular restriction is a viewpoint or subject matter restriction 
before conducting the forum analysis.  938 F.3d 424, 431–32 
(3d Cir. 2019).  That is “because the type of forum sheds no 
light on whether a policy or decision discriminates against a 
certain viewpoint.  And viewpoint discrimination is 
impermissible in any forum.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
 Freethought, however, differs from this case in one 
important respect.  The Supreme Court’s recent case Mansky, 
which held that content-based restrictions on speech in 
nonpublic fora are unconstitutional if they are incapable of 
reasoned application, squarely resolves the issues in this case.  
138 S. Ct. at 1892.   
 Mansky sets a baseline requirement that all forms of 
content-based restrictions must be capable of reasoned 
application.  In other words, even if the content-based 
restriction is one that merely restricts certain subjects, as 
opposed to certain viewpoints, it must at the very least be 
capable of reasoned application.  Freethought did not foreclose 
the possibility that we might find a government restriction on 
speech, at the threshold, to be incapable of reasoned 
application and therefore impermissible in any forum.  Indeed, 
such a finding would avoid wading into First Amendment 
issues that need not be resolved to dispose of a case.  
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Accordingly, we are not required to decide in the first instance 
whether the policy here is based on viewpoint or subject 
matter, just as we are not required initially to decide whether 
the forum at issue is public or nonpublic.  At a minimum, 
SEPTA’s restrictions on speech must be capable of reasoned 
application.4  See NAACP, 834 F.3d at 449 (“No matter the type 
 
 4 In the context of other content-based restrictions on 
speech, such as gag orders, at least one other circuit has opined 
that the condition that restraints on speech be capable of 
reasoned application is a core one and is capable of being 
resolved before determining whether a restriction is based on 
viewpoint or subject matter.  See In re Murphy-Brown, LLC, 
907 F.3d 788, 800 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding that a gag order, 
which petitioner argued discriminated based on viewpoint, was 
unconstitutionally vague, and therefore incapable of reasoned 
application, because “it forced individuals to ‘guess at its 
contours’”).  In In re Murphy-Brown, the Fourth Circuit 
helpfully explained:  
[t]his core requirement of clarity avoids twin 
problems.  For one, “[t]he interpretive process 
itself would create an inevitable, pervasive, and 
serious risk of chilling protected speech pending 
the drawing of fine distinctions that, in the end, 
would themselves be questionable.”  Vague 
restraints also pose the risk of discriminatory or 
arbitrary enforcement.   
Id.  (citing Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. at 327 & Gentile 




of forum, restrictions on speech on government property must 
be reasonable.”).  For the following reasons, we find that they 
are not, and we conclude our First Amendment inquiry there.   
 Analysis 
 The question at the heart of this appeal therefore is 
whether the current Advertising Standards, either in their 
original form or as revised by the District Court, are capable of 
reasoned application.  Assuming without deciding that the 
restrictions at issue are content-based and that the relevant 
forum is nonpublic, the current Advertising Standards only 
need to be “reasonable.”  Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Ind., 385 F.3d 
274, 279 (3d Cir. 2004).  In this context, “reasonable” means 
that they must be “designed to confine the ‘forum to the limited 
and legitimate purposes for which it was created.’”  Id. 
(quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829).  The government actor 
bears the burden of “tying the limitation on speech to the 
forum’s purpose.”  NAACP, 834 F.3d at 445.   
 SEPTA sells advertisements to “raise revenue . . . in a 
manner that provides for the safety, efficiency[,] and comfort 
of [its] passengers.”  App. 1083.  Accordingly, we will discuss 
whether the current Advertising Standards are capable of 
reasoned application given these goals.  Before discussing 
SEPTA’s arguments detailing why the current Advertising 
Standards satisfy this requirement, a discussion of Mansky, 
which we find controlling here, is necessary. 
 Mansky involved a challenge to a Minnesota law that 
prohibited individuals from making certain statements inside 
or near a polling location.  The specific provision at issue 
prohibited individuals from wearing a “political badge, 
political button, or other political insignia . . . at or about the 
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polling place.”  Mansky, 138 S. Ct. at 1883.  There, the Court 
held first that a polling place in Minnesota qualifies as a 
nonpublic forum.  Id. at 1886.  Because the provision did not 
“discriminate[] on the basis of viewpoint on its face,” the 
question before the Court was whether the political apparel ban 
was “reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum.”  
Id.  (citation omitted).  The Court found that the interest of 
protecting voters at the polling location from messages that 
would distract them from “the important decisions 
immediately at hand” was sufficient to permit Minnesota to 
“choose to prohibit certain apparel . . . because of the message 
it conveys.”  Id. at 1888.  The Court held, however, that the 
term “political,” which was not defined in the statute and which 
had been interpreted in various ways in the State’s official 
guidance documents, was not “capable of reasoned 
application.”  Id. at 1892. 
 In deciding that the term “political” as used in the 
Minnesota statute was unconstitutional, the Mansky Court 
considered several factors that are relevant here: whether the 
terms are “indeterminate,” such as by being left undefined in 
the statute or government policy at issue, and whether they 
have been or are susceptible to “erratic application.”  Mansky, 
138 S. Ct. at 1889, 1890.  According to Mansky, a prohibition 
on speech is unreasonable if it fails to “articulate some sensible 
basis for distinguishing what may come in from what must stay 
out.”  Id. at 1888. 
 CIR contends that the District Court, in attempting to 
cure the constitutional deficiencies in the 2015 Advertising 
Standards, erred in finding that the revised policy was capable 
of reasoned application.  That is so, CIR argues, because the 
current Advertising Standards continue to prohibit 
advertisements that “contain political messages” and those that 
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address “political . . . issues.”  Appellant Br. 49.  According to 
CIR, both phrases pose the same First Amendment problems 
as the portions of the 2015 Advertising Standards that the 
District Court had already found unconstitutional under 
Mansky.   
 SEPTA disagrees and argues that the restrictions at 
issue here differ from those in Mansky.  Because of those 
differences, SEPTA contends, we should hold that the current 
Advertising Standards are capable of reasoned application and 
uphold the decision of the District Court.  As a threshold 
matter, SEPTA questions CIR’s broad reading of Manksy 
because of the Supreme Court’s earlier plurality decision in 
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), in 
which the Court upheld a prohibition on political 
advertisements on city buses.  SEPTA argues that the 
continued vitality of Lehman, which the Supreme Court cites 
favorably in Mansky, see 138 S. Ct. at 1885–86, means that not 
all bans on political advertisements are unconstitutional.   
 SEPTA attempts to distinguish the current Advertising 
Standards from the political apparel ban in Manksy in three 
ways.  First, Mansky presented, according to the Supreme 
Court, “a particularly difficult reconciliation: the 
accommodation of the right to engage in political discourse 
with the right to vote.”  Id. at 1892 (quoting Burson v. 
Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992)).  Second, SEPTA argues 
that the ban in Mansky was especially problematic because 
Minnesota had “issued contradictory implementing 
guidelines.”  Appellee Br. 48.  Here, in contrast, SEPTA 
represents that it has not issued any such guidelines.  Third, the 
Minnesota law empowered temporary government employees 
(i.e., county election judges) to make quick decisions about 
what may or may not be a political issue.  Here, again, SEPTA 
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contends that its practices are far more robust:  SEPTA does 
not impose a pressing deadline, and it requires its General 
Counsel, and sometimes other lawyers, to determine whether 
an advertisement falls within a prohibition. 
 SEPTA’s arguments, while forceful, are ultimately 
unpersuasive.  Although the Supreme Court explicitly stated 
that its holding in Mansky did not “set the outer limit of what a 
State may proscribe,” 138 S. Ct. at 1891, it did not limit its 
holding to polling locations.  More to the point, SEPTA does 
not challenge the District Court’s holding that portions of the 
Challenged Provisions were overbroad, but it fails to offer any 
reason why the lingering references to advertisements that 
“contain political messages” and those that address “political 
issues” are any more capable of reasoned application than 
those that were struck down.  This is an especially important 
question given that the District Court broadened the public 
debate provision by eliminating the limiting phrase “matters of 
public debate about.”   
 In addition, when asked during oral argument whether 
SEPTA would determine a series of hypothetical 
advertisements to be in violation of the current Advertising 
Standards, SEPTA’s counsel’s answers further highlighted the 
arbitrariness of the decision-making process.  For example, 
when we asked whether an advertisement that depicted three 
girls of different races holding hands with a message that says, 
“This is how racism ends,” would be political, counsel for 
SEPTA responded “no, I don’t think so.”  Oral Argument at 
23:33–24:04, Ctr. for Investigative Reporting v. SEPTA (No. 
19-1170), https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/ 
19-1170CenterforInvestigativeReportingvSEPTA.mp3.  
When the Court adjusted the hypothetical to include the same 
picture with a message that says, “This is what America looks 
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like,” counsel for SEPTA responded by asking, “Who’s putting 
the ad on?”  Id. at 24:13–24:21.  That response highlights the 
extent to which the current Advertising Standards are 
susceptible to erratic application.   
 As the Mansky Court explained, while the First 
Amendment does not require “[p]erfect clarity and precise 
guidance,” when the “restriction[s] go beyond close calls on 
borderline or fanciful cases . . . [,] that is a serious matter when 
the whole point of the exercise is to prohibit the expression of 
political views.”  Id. at 1891 (citation omitted).  A policy as ill-
defined as SEPTA’s carries “[t]he opportunity for abuse, 
especially where [it] has received a virtually open-ended 
interpretation.”  Bd. of Airport Comm’rs of L.A. v. Jews for 
Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 576 (1987) (citation omitted) (first 
alteration in original) (second alteration added). 
 Moreover, far from helping SEPTA’s case, the absence 
of guidelines cabining SEPTA’s General Counsel’s discretion 
in determining what constitutes a political advertisement 
actually suggests that, like the Minnesota statute in Mansky, 
the lack of “objective, workable standards” may allow 
SEPTA’s General Counsel’s “own politics [to] shape his views 
on what counts as ‘political.’”  Mansky, 138 S. Ct. at 1891.  
That was precisely the problem at the heart of Mansky and 
nothing in the District Court’s revision of the 2015 Advertising 
Standards helps to ameliorate that concern here.  In fact, in its 
post-trial brief, SEPTA conceded that it should have rejected a 
union advertisement supporting the DNC.  SEPTA also 
accepted an advertisement that included a Black youth wearing 
a t-shirt that says “My Life Matters.”  Although such a 
statement arguably should not be “political,” the phrasing “My 
Life Matters” clearly alludes to the Black Lives Matter 
movement, which campaigns against violence aimed at Black 
 
30 
people and which has become a lightning rod in the media.  To 
many, such an advertisement would clearly be prohibited under 
the Advertising Standards, even as revised by the District 
Court.  Yet Benedetti determined that it was not. 
 To be sure, one or two inconsistencies hardly proves 
that SEPTA has arbitrarily applied its Advertising Standards, 
but the lack of structure and clear policies governing the 
decision-making process creates a real risk that it may be 
arbitrarily applied.  And CIR has amply demonstrated that at 
least on a few occasions that risk has become a reality.  
Accordingly, we reverse the District Court’s holding that the 
current Advertising Standards are capable of reasoned 
application. 
 Remedy 
 Having decided that the Challenged Provisions are 
unconstitutional, we must now determine the appropriate 
remedy.  CIR contends that the District Court should have 
entered final judgment completely in its favor and directed 
SEPTA to run its advertisement.  For the following reasons, we 
find that the District Court erred in failing to order SEPTA to 
run CIR’s proposed advertisements.  We will therefore reverse 
the District Court’s judgment and remand the case for entry of 
judgment in favor of CIR.5 
 Because CIR prevails on the merits, it must also show 
that “it is entitled to a permanent injunction as a matter of 
 
 5 SEPTA, of course, is free to revise its Advertising 
Standards again to cabin the decisionmaker’s discretion in 
applying the ban on “political” advertisements.  
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discretion.”  Ne. Pa. Freethought Soc’y, 938 F.3d at 442 (citing 
Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 157 
(2010); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 
(2006)).  To do so, CIR “must show that (1) it has suffered 
irreparable injury; (2) there is no adequate remedy at law; (3) 
the balance of hardships tips in its favor; and (4) granting an 
injunction would not be against the public interest.”  Id. 
(citation omitted).  
 Here, each of these elements is satisfied.  First, CIR’s 
advertisement has already been rejected once under the 2015 
Advertising Standards.  As discussed above, the current 
Advertising Standards reflect only the modest revisions 
imposed by the District Court, which fail to cure their 
constitutional deficiencies.  Second, and relatedly, no remedy 
at law can cure CIR’s First Amendment injury because “[t]he 
loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods 
of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”  Elrod 
v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976).  The only way for CIR to 
get complete relief is for the District Court to order SEPTA to 
run the advertisement.  Third, the only hardship to SEPTA is 
the burden of redrafting the political and public debate 
provisions of its current Advertising Standards, if it chooses to 
do so.  In contrast, the hardship to CIR is considerable in that 
the current Advertising Standards impermissibly deprive it of 
its, and other potential speakers’, constitutional rights to 
engage in free speech.  Fourth, and finally, the public interest 
does not suffer by enforcing the First Amendment’s protection 
against restrictions on speech that are incapable of reasoned 
application. 
* * * * * 
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 The Challenged Provisions of the current Advertising 
Standards are incapable of reasoned application.  Accordingly, 
we will reverse the judgment of the District Court and instruct 
it to grant declaratory relief and issue an injunction barring 
enforcement of the Challenged Provisions of the current 
Advertising Standards against CIR. 
